Syria

Stories from Hama: Memories of Painter Khaled Al-Khani. Part 1

Jan 18

Introduction by Off the Wall

A painting by Syrian painter Khaled Al-Khani

In few more days, the thirtieth anniversary of the massacre of Hama (February, 1982) will befall us. This time, the anniversary has a special meaning as Syrians, who have broken the fear barrier, are now openly talking about the events that transpired thirty years ago in their homeland. We are helped nowadays in that even the dumbest observer can recognize the lies of the Assad regime, and that has made many of us search for the real narrative of Hama, a narrative that the regime has for decades tried to suppress through its demonization of the Muslim Brotherhood, and to hide, by extension, the stories of the innocent victims of Hafez Assad and his henchmen which according to people from Hama, may have reached 40,000 murdered souls, not to mention the rapes, the pillaging and hateful acts of barbarism the aging thugs are now trying to blame each others for.

As the sons of the perpetrators of the Hama Massacre, helped undoubtedly by some of those who participated in it, now attempt to suppress the current Syrian uprising through similar machination of brutality, lies, and deceptions, it becomes more necessary than ever for us to recover the real narrative of Hama. It is the narrative of the children who witnessed their fathers and older brothers being murdered, of women who were raped and killed in cold blood, and of entire city districts raised to ground out of vengeful hate that shames us all for its existence among our sentient specie.

My friend Khaled Al-Khani, then a seven years old child, is now a renowned Syrian painter. He tells the story of the massacre as he witnessed it and lived it through the murder of his father, his own epic journey with the few women and children who survived Assad’s murderous machine. In this and the next two posts, I will attempt to bring Khaled’s memories to English readers. It is only my way of telling the Assad gang, we will hold those who did it accountable, and we will not allow you to do the same, Never again.

**********

Stories from Hama (Memories of Painter Khaled Al-Khani) Part I

I do not know what happened to me today…? I don’t want to remain in hiding and I will go to my workshop and to every demonstration. I can no longer hide my real identity. I, the artist, have turned into a rebel ever since the Libyan embassy incident. My transformation has nothing to do with my distant memories, in Hama, of my father’s murder and the death of the city of my childhood, the rape our women, our imprisonment, our bombardment, and the subsequent conquering and forcible displacement of those who were left alive among us to the countryside as means to cover the crimes.

I swear to God I’m not hateful and I am not seeking revenge, but just retribution. My current sorrow is related to what I witness transpiring around me daily. We demonstrate, they shoot us with bullets, we then join funeral processions, and they rain a hail of lead on us. And as we walk once more in the next funeral procession, they reply with the same, and so on. We stay in our homes, they break our doors arresting us and intimidating our mothers, if I am not killed, someone else will be.

I swear to God I love life, but I love justice more. Please, tell me what to do. I do not know what befell me today? Today I remembered, more than any other day, I remembered my father. My father was an ophthalmologist in Hama. He was not a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, but he sided with the people of his ravished city. Believe me, and half the people of Hama testify to that. They gouged one of his eyes while he was a live, then they killed him and horribly mutilated his body. I was little when we buried him and I remember that he had no eyes.

In February 1982, I was a 6 year old first grader. We had just finished the first school semester and had gone on spring break, and what a holiday.. At night, and as we slept, we could hear loud sounds breaking the place’s silence and turning its serenity into a murderous horror. Obvious was the panic on my aunt who raised me and next to whom I would sleep to compensate her unfulfilled motherhood because she never married, and thus lived with us in our beautiful two-story traditional Arabic home. The rest of my family and my father and my mother slept on the second floor. Soon, I would hear the voices of my siblings and my father and mother becoming louder coming down the stairs and entering my aunt’s room as the shooting increased. My mother said to my father “Didn’t I tell you to stay on the farm?” For many year, this sentence did not go away from my memories, and the idea that my father left the farm hurt me a great deal and remained with me until I had grown up, forgiven him and reckoned, It was destiny.

******

The sound of firing fills life. It was the first time I heard its wheeze. It rose further and then began the thunder of explosions. As the hours passed, we got used to these sounds. Time passed and some of the neighbors started flocking to our home. Chaos is everywhere, children crying, women reading the Qur’an, and great concern. This continued for three days, and then we heard a big explosion. Father said that a shell hit the top floor. The house shook as dust filled my lungs like it filled the place and women recited Surat Yassin (the verse of Yassin). Meanwhile, a wave of sharp cries rose and father said we must leave the house as fast as possible, so we went out and people started to gather while shouting. Panic dominated everything, and we went to the house of a neighbor, then to a dark cellar thought by the men a more secure place. There were more of us than the place could accommodate. We stayed there for three days while the firing continued with no stopping. Then an artillery shell, Surat Yassin kept rising all the way to the sky, a second shell and a third, causing the cellar to vibrate madly. While no one of those who took refuge in the basement was hurt, many residents of our neighborhood perished and many were wounded. The doctor who lived in the neighborhood was able to save some. We stayed in the basement until the bombardment and firing calmed down and they got us out saying that we must leave towards safer neighborhoods. Little they knew, for they were wrong as it did not occur to them that a campaign of genocide was taking place. We went out hurriedly through the Hadher market to reach the Ameeriyyah district. We encountered streets through which we had to crawl because snipers were everywhere.

After incredible difficulties, we reached the Ameeriyyah neighborhood having just crawled the last street with my father helping my aging aunt to whose side I was totally stuck. My mother and sisters crossed with the rest of the people, and the three of us stayed. But then my father asked me to leave with everyone and I refused because I wanted to stay with my aunt who raised me. He forced me to catch up with my mother and the others and he stayed with my aunt, and this was the last time I saw my father alive.

In the Ameeriyyah district, we continued to search for a shelter and we found a cellar packed with people, but they could not let us in because our numbers were very large (most of the population of Baroudeye neighborhood). Later, they let my father and my aunt in because they were only two. The refuge in the Ameeriyyah is where my father was arrested and where my aunt survived to witness and tell of what happened.

****

Our group followed the road towards Northern Ameeriyyah where we found a shelter large enough for all of us. We stayed in that shelter until the arrival of the “Syrian Arab Army” whence the shelter was turned into a prison. They took all the men including young men out of the shelter and promptly executed some of them right at the door and arrested the elderly men. Only women and children remained in the place. Some were crying, while the majority were forced to shout, at gun threat (“with our blood we sacrifice ourselves for you Hafez“, بالروح بالدم نفديك يا حافظ and ”O God, it is high time for Hafez to take your place” يا الله حلك حلك يقعد حافظ محلك) in order to worsen our humiliation. Our imprisonment lasted three days while they murdered whomever they wanted. I swear to God we stayed without food, and I still remember the smell of the place. It was unbearable. We constantly heard screaming voices outside the basement, voices of women being raped, and of and torture that would still visibly affect me whenever I recall or try to describe. Some women had few candies ad Chocolate with them, and before they took the men, one of them brought a few loaves of bread and olives that we shared, and which was barely enough for one man. Women kept reading Qur’an continuously, albeit in hushed voice. Then the door opened and they ordered us to get out because they said they will now execute us. We got out as we were shouting “we sacrifice our blood for you …..”, but then they told us that we must head in the direction of the Aleppo Road outside the city.

We walked, raising our arms and repeating what we were told to repeat. The landscape was surreal, the place was full of corpses, swollen, of black blood, and as we moved from one street to another, bodies and destruction were everywhere. We proceeded until we reached the Omar Ibn Khattab Mosque (of which you have been hearing lately as the place where demonstrations to demand freedom started). The Mosque was destroyed completely, with the washing room being the only section left. In there, there were some army soldiers who terrified us by pointing their rifles and machine guns at us forcing us to lie face down on the ground. Then they brought us into the washing room and shut the door tightly. Some women begged the army men to kill us and let everyone else out of the city, but they refused. When we entered the washing room we found fungus covered stale bread that we ate. There were also two ornamental statues of white doves. I do not know why they were there, but to me they signaled the beginning of salvation from the bloodbath. The door remained locked for a day and a half, after which one of officers shouted a speech at us in which he said:

“she who awaits her husband or brother or son or father, don’t be waiting for him because he will not come out alive and will never return.”

They released us in the direction of Aleppo, we walked more than ten kilometers racing against time as we cried and barefoot women kept reading the Qur’an, and whenever we heard the shooting, we instantly lied down, until we reached the point where they had allowed the villagers access to help the survivors. What can I say … I swear by God, this is only the tip of the iceberg.

……….. To be continued

I encourage you to visit the online gallery of Khaled Al-Khani and see how Hama echos resonate in his work

Note from OTW: I have opted not to use images of the Massacre and instead to use painting from Khaled Al-Khani’s great work to highlight the tenacity of life despite of the tyrants. Life is what we seek, and the memories of death and destruction brought on Syria by the Assad family will be with us for long time, but hopefully only in the sense that will motivate us to prevent such atrocities from hapening again, not only in Syria, but everywhere.

January 19, 2012 0

The Maysaloon Syria Digest

The tension that is building up in Syria will, I suspect, shortly reach a climax. I have never seen the Russians appear as adamant about their position regarding any country in the world as they are now with regards to Syria. Arms shipments and the threat of vetoing any security council resolution condemning the Syrian regime and potentially leading to armed intervention there, are all providing the regime with the diplomatic cover it so desperately needs in order to ensure its survival. The counter-revolutionary rhetoric, what with people citing dubious polls claiming Assad still has the support of 55% of the Syrian people, or horror stories of sectarian strife, are all reaching fever pitch and I suspect this is in anticipation of some new development that we can expect.

Obama’s latest statement condemning the Syrian regime and asking it to step down, and after such a long period of quiet, might be a sign from the White House for another diplomatic bout of thrusting and parrying with the allies of the Assad regime. Watch the Turks and the Saudis closely for further statements in the next few days, and probably another attempt to get something pushed through the security council. I don’t know how wise it would be to push for such a resolution with Russia guaranteeing it will veto anything and everything that might endanger Assad’s rule internationally.

On other front’s, al Jazeera is once again claiming that it’s signals are being jammed from locations in Syria and Iran, which I suspect is true as Gaddafi’s regime had also tried to jam the station’s satellite broadcasts. This is probably meant as a way to hassle to the station, which has been condemned by the Syrian regime and those who sympathise with it that it is now merely a propaganda channel. Ultimately, it is unlikely that any foreign intervention in Syria is going to take place any time soon, and even if it does take place, I’m not so sure how much better it will be for the country.

The other alternative, civil war, is being played out slowly but surely. The so-called Free Syrian army has been mounting bolder attacks, and has been maintaining a stout defence in Homs, the heartland of the Syrian revolution, as well as in the Zabadani and Madaya suburbs of Damascus more recently. It’s not clear how much longer they can maintain this, but I think the steady trickle of defections that are happening could start turning into an avalanche if this situation continues. On another front, the Syrian currency has recently sunk to a jaw-dropping low of 70.5 Syrian pounds to the dollar. Any more than that and the Syrian economy will start to go into free-fall.

I think all this discussion and condemnation of international intevention is a moot point. If this situation continues the way it is any longer, without one side trying to end the stalemate in its favour, then this regime could implode. Hezbullah daren’t get itself embroiled into a Syrian civil war and stretch itself with Israel lurking just south of the border, and Iran, with all its enthusiasm, is too far from Syria to do anything more than token support and advice. We’re not going to see divisions of the Quds brigade airlifted to Damascus just to prop up Assad, though we could start seeing a bigger spurt of suicide bombings, explosions and assassinations. Still, the country is crumbling under the political crisis, and whilst Assad is preparing to dig himself deeply for a long fight, he might find himself a prisoner in his own palace, as he faces not just defected Syrian soldiers, but the economic influence of the wealthy, bourgeois, Syrian diaspora who are enthusiastically supporting the Syrian revolution.

In the meantime, the Syrian regime has utterly failed in crushing the demonstrations that have been the lifeblood of this revolution. I’m watching further demonstrations in Deraa, the town where this all started, on al Jazeera right now. At the start of the Syrian revolution the Syrian army carried out a brutal operation that was meant to punish the rebellious inhabitants, and yet the people there are now demonstrating again. Assad can’t impose his will on the country anymore, and there are few places where he or his father’s statues or posters are hung up without risk of defacement. If Assad does survive this period, then it will be as a warlord, and not as a president.

source

January 19, 2012 0

Syrian women, backbone of the revolution

by Rime Allaf

Rime Allaf is an associate fellow at Chatham House in London. She is a regular contributor to Media Monitors Network (MMN).

(Monday, January 16, 2012)

“Syrian women have also been essential components of the now famous flash mobs that have so angered the regime with their speed and their efficient messages. Often, women will join the group and start chanting while wearing a headscarf, then separate at the first sign of the infamous “shabbiha” and yank their hijabs off their heads as they melt into the crowd.”

On January 10, while President Bashar Assad addressed his supporters in Damascus, Syrian authorities handed the tiny tortured body of a four-month old baby girl to her uncle in Homs. Arrested with her parents a few days earlier, one can only assume, knowing the Syrian regime’s documented brutality, that baby Afaf had been thrown into a cell with her mother and submitted to horrific treatment, terrorizing her and her mother and leading to her untimely death.

In its violent repression of the uprising, the Syrian regime has made no distinction between men and women or between adults and children. There has been equality in oppressing, and equality in suffering. But there has also been equality in protesting, albeit in varying degrees of visibility and in different forms.

For the last ten months of the Syrian revolution, many skeptics have repeated the tired refrain that women have been absent from the uprising and that it seems to be a male- dominated (read “Islamist-leaning”) protest movement. Such generalizations, meant to discredit the revolution, do much injustice to the women who have lived the uprising from the start at the side of their compatriots.

It is true that the initial Friday-centric demonstrations were, by default, overwhelmingly comprised of men. With no other possibility to gather freely, protesters met at the mosque and grouped at the end of Friday prayers to start marching and chanting, and week after week the presence of women in these demos was negligible. Moreover, there is little doubt that the sheer brutality of the regime, with its blind random shootings, would have led many men to insist that their female relatives remain at home in an attempt to keep them out of harm’s way.

In this, the Syrian revolution may have differed from others where women were visible from the start, especially as most other revolutions have begun in big cities. But no other revolution has been suppressed with the ferocity of the Syrian regime, nor has any other country (save for Libya after the military intervention started) endured so many casualties. Declaring the Syrian uprising to be woman-less, therefore, would reflect a rather skewed view on the situation and a superficial understanding of how the Syrian regime acts.

As repression got more brutal, the demonstrations spread throughout the country and extended beyond Friday prayers. This resulted in a noticeable increase of women on the streets of Syria, chanting alongside the men and running under fire alongside men. Some organized women-only demonstrations, others mingled in the mixed crowds and some took microphones to lead gatherings’ defiant chants, such as the woman who electrified Homs when she shouted to a roaring crowd that her children would not attend a school that had been used as a torture center.

Even when they weren’t taking to the streets, women’s participation in the revolution has been constant. They have made signs, helped give first aid to the wounded, and run charity networks to distribute aid to the neediest families under siege from the army. While these activities were not undertaken exclusively by women, they played an important role in the logistics behind the protests.

At the same time, civil activism began to develop into new forms, unveiling Syrian creativity and a pressing urge to raise the voice of the revolution. Initiatives included numerous film clips of women in nondescript interiors, their faces hidden with masks and scarves to protect their identity, holding signs that often centered around a single message that the viewer discovered as the camera went around the room. Such events made the rounds of the social networks in the most YouTubed revolution of the “Arab spring”, letting the internet amplify the power of these peaceful protests.

Syrian women have also been essential components of the now famous flash mobs that have so angered the regime with their speed and their efficient messages. Often, women will join the group and start chanting while wearing a headscarf, then separate at the first sign of the infamous “shabbiha” and yank their hijabs off their heads as they melt into the crowd.

Examples of such varied participation are plentiful enough and put to rest the shaky theories about women in Syria’s revolution. In fact, when considering the number of prominent female activists, Syria seems to be a leader rather than a follower, rightfully boasting of the women active in civil society and in revolution. Activists such as Suheir Atassi and Razan Zeitouneh, veterans on the socio-political underground scene at the grassroots level, and writers such as Samar Yazbek, have been part and parcel of the civil society movement challenging the regime openly from inside Syria. Since the revolution began, more women have become focal points for the protest movement, including actresses May Skaf, who was one of the first artists to participate in protests and to be arrested, and Fadwa Suleiman, who has been chanting defiantly from the heart of embattled and besieged Homs.

Moreover, the women who have been politically vocal and active in opposition, including in the main organized groups, seem to easily outnumber, especially proportionally, those in other revolutionary countries. There have been numerous Syrian women discussing Syrian affairs on pan-Arab media, and most are well-known among their compatriots.

While they never imagined that their children would be such easy prey for the regime nor intended them to be part of the movement, Syrian women have from the start been an integral element in the revolution. There is no doubt that they will also be an integral component of post-revolution Syria.

—————————————–

* First published by the bitterlemons.org

taken from here

January 17, 2012 0

Syria now سوريا الآن

[youtube http://youtu.be/WvLkAhykpV8?]

The film from the pain of the Syrian people الفيلم من آلام الشعب السوري

January 17, 2012 0

The Alternative to Assad? You’re looking at it

[youtube http://youtu.be/Nv48dFynDdM?]

Khaled Abu Salah is a man that has appeared a number of times on al Jazeera reports, and I first saw him when he was courageously telling one of the Arab inspectors about the horrific situation in Homs. I like his reasonable, sensible approach to explaining what is happening, and I worry about what would happen to him if the security services ever captured him. Here is a video of a short speech that is said to have been filmed today. If and when this is all over, watch people like him very closely. These people have emerged from Syria’s streets and alleys and they are the future political generation that will help lead Syria – not some political dinosaur in exile abroad. When people sarcastically ask me who the alternative to Assad is, I think of people like Khaled Abu Salah. Why shouldn’t a man like him become a future president of Syria?

I’ve done my best to translate it below:

Today, we have all come here, but not to offer condolences to Abu Muhammad. No, we have come here to offer him congratulations for the martyrdom of Muhammad Rabee. And to tell Abu Muhammad that we are all his children.

And guys, the most important thing that we have seen in this revolution is that we have all become brothers and family. But we are all revolutionaries, and the most important thing is to avoid showing sadness, because by God’s will he is now a martyr. I don’t want anybody to offer me their condolences. Congratulate me, for martyrdom is a medal that we can pin to our chests. This is our path and we chose it on the 15th of March. We all – together – went to pray in the square and offered the “prayer of the departing” before we went out to demonstrate.

Gentlemen, the revolution is not one of rights and jobs, it is not a revolution for bread, the revolution is a cause. If we cry for our martyrs, or feel sad, that does not mean that our resolve has weakened, no! We cry for them to remember them constantly, and remember that their blood is a debt we owe to them, all of them. We are all the children of this country, and whoever loves his country will sacrifice his life for it. Abu Muhammad we are all your children today, and God bless you all.

[There is a brief interlude where the crowd cheers and he gives some instructions for organising the next Friday’s protests]

Guys, let me tell you something. I swear that as long as we are going out in the name of God, then we should follow his teachings and love each other. Let us love each other, and if somebody makes a mistake we should forgive him – we are all the same! If we love our friend and he makes a mistake, then we tell him that he made a mistake and forgive him. If we all continue to love each other, then no security, no army, no shabiha, no Iran and not even Russia can stand against us. God bless you all!

January 17, 2012 0

كيف يفكر بشار الاسد الجزء الثاني (in English)

[youtube http://youtu.be/NAABQfGN1ns?]

January 17, 2012 0

Wikileaks : RE-ENGAGING SYRIA: DEALING WITH SARG DIPLOMACY

Viewing cable 09DAMASCUS384,

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
09DAMASCUS384	2009-06-03 13:23	2011-08-30 01:44	SECRET//NOFORN	Embassy Damascus
Appears in these articles: http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/08/03/119333/wikileaks-bush-obama-passed-on.html

VZCZCXRO9472
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHDM #0384/01 1541323
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 031323Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6431
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 000384 

NOFORN
SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2018
TAGS: PREL SY
SUBJECT: RE-ENGAGING SYRIA:  DEALING WITH SARG DIPLOMACY 

Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 

¶1.  (S/NF) Summary:  As the U.S. continues its re-engagement
with Syria, it may help us achieve our goals if we understand
how SARG officials pursue diplomatic goals. Syrian President
Bashar al-Asad is neither as shrewd nor as long-winded as his
father but he, too, prefers to engage diplomatically on a
level of abstraction that seems designed to frustrate any
direct challenge to Syria's behavior and, by extension, his
judgment.  Bashar's vanity represents another Achilles heel:
the degree to which USG visitors add to his consequence to
some degree affects the prospects for a successful meeting.
The SARG foreign policy apparatus suffers from apparent
dysfunctionality and weaknesses in terms of depth and
resources but the SARG punches above its weight because of
the talents of key individuals.  SARG officials generally
have clear, if tactical, guidance from Bashar and they are
sufficiently professional to translate those instructions
into recognizable diplomatic practice.  But in a diplomatic
world that is generally oiled by courtesy and euphemism, the
Syrians don't hesitate to be nasty in order to achieve their
objectives.  The behaviors they employ as diplomatic
"force-multipliers" are the hallmarks of a Syrian diplomatic
style that is at best abrasive and, at its worst, brutal.
End Summary. 

-------------------
Gaming Out the SARG
------------------- 

¶2.  (S/NF) As the U.S. moves forward to re-engage Syria, we
are well aware that Syrian officials have long been famous
for their abilities as tough negotiators.  The late President
Hafiz al-Asad could wear down his interlocutors through sheer
staying power in 10-hour meetings without breaks; the wealth
of detail and historical perspective he brought to those
discussions also tested the mettle of those who were
attempting to persuade him to a course of action he
questioned.  His son Bashar is neither as shrewd nor as
long-winded as his father but he, too, prefers to engage
diplomatically on a level of abstraction that seems designed
to frustrate any direct challenge to Syria's behavior and, by
extension, his judgment.  Bashar's presentations on world
affairs suggest that he would prefer to see himself as a sort
of philosopher-king, the Pericles of Damascus.  Playing to
Bashar's intellectual pretentions is one stratagem for
gaining his confidence and acquiescence; it may be
time-consuming but could well produce results.  Bashar's
vanity represents another Achilles heel:  the degree to which
USG visitors add to his consequence to some degree affects
the prospects for achieving our goals.  Every interaction we
have with the SARG is, in fact, a transaction and the better
equipped we are to understand the dynamics of our
negotiations the better able we will be to achieve our
objectives.  Post has assembled the compendium below in an
attempt to reflect our experience in dealing with the SARG in
the hope that Washington-based interlocutors will find it
useful. 

------------------------------------
A Compendium of Diplomatic Behaviors
------------------------------------ 

¶3. (S/NF) Capacity:  SARG scope of action is limited the
President's span of control.  He is generally able to monitor
 the activities of his foreign minister, political/media
advisor, intelligence chiefs, and brother Maher.  At various
times, his vice president and national security advisor are
also active and therefore under his direct supervision.
While communication flows between him and his subordinates,
it appears not to be formalized and information is highly
compartmented.  Subordinates' portfolios are not clearly
delineated; overlapping areas create tension and competition.
 There is no "interagency" policy development process that
lays out advantages and disadvantages of policy choices.
There are, as far as we know, no briefing or decision memos.
The bench is not deep; beyond the principals lie only a few
trusted staffers.  Bashar and his team also find it difficult
to juggle more than one major foreign policy issue at a time. 

¶4. (S/NF) Protocol:  SARG officials are sticklers for
diplomatic protocol, although they are not experts on the
international conventions from which it is derived.   The
SARG places a high value on protocolary forms that ensure
respectful treatment of state officials (despite bilateral
differences) because such forms guarantee that the President
and his representatives are shown proper courtesies by a
world that is often at odds with Syria.  (This focus on
protocol underlies the continuing Syrian unhappiness over the
absence of a U.S. ambassador.)  Protocol conventions also
reinforce the notion of equal relations between sovereign
states and the SARG insists that communications between it
and foreign embassies comply with traditional diplomatic
practice.  The MFA receives a flood of diplomatic notes from
Damascus-based foreign missions daily which are apportioned
out to various offices for action.  The diplomatic notes,
translated into Arabic by the senders, become the paper trail
for SARG decisions.  The MFA bureaucracy does not appear to
generate cover memoranda that provide background to requests
or recommendations for decisions.  Many such notes, possibly
all notes from the U.S. Embassy, are sent to the Minister
himself for review.  The MFA does not have internal email,
only fax and phone.  Instructions to Syrian missions abroad
are often sent by fax; sometimes the MFA fails to provide
instructions at all. 

¶5. (S/NF) The Suq:  In dealing with the U.S., the Syrians see
every encounter as a transaction.  The level and composition
of the Syrian side of any meeting is carefully calculated in
terms of protocol and the political message being sent; a
lunch invitation must be interpreted as more than just the
Arab compulsion to hospitality ) who hosts the lunch is as
important as who attends the meetings.  When it comes to
content, the Syrians seek to gain the highest value
deliverable for the lowest price or no price at all.  During
the re-engagement process, the SARG has attempted to extract
high profile USG gestures in exchange for relief of
operational constraints on the Embassy.  The SARG has been
uncharacteristically forward-leaning in allowing discussions
on a New Embassy Compound site to develop as far as they
have; actual closure on a land deal, however, is probably
contingent on U.S. delivery of a SARG desirable, e.g., the
announcement that a U.S. ambassador will be sent to Damascus.
 The SARG's focus on embassy operations is in part rooted in
their paranoia over USG intelligence collection and
penetration of Syrian society but the imposition of
constraints on mission activities has also conveniently
created an embassy list of desiderata that the SARG seeks to
use as cost-free concessions.  FM Muallim candidly
acknowledged this approach when he commented in February to
Charge that he had not yet decided what he needed in exchange
for permission to reopen the American School in Damascus. 

¶6.  (S/NF) Vanity and Self-preservation:  The President's
self-image plays a disproportionate role in policy
formulation and diplomatic activity.   Meetings, visits,
trips abroad that enhance his respectability and prestige are
pursued; encounters that may involve negotiations or
difficult debate are declined or delegated to subordinates.
The President responds with anger if he finds himself
challenged by visitors, but not until after the meeting.  He
seems to avoid direct confrontation.  When engaged in summit
diplomacy, he often seeks to include allies to bolster his
confidence (e.g., Quadripartite Summit in September 2008,
Riyadh Summit in April 2009).   His foreign policy
subordinates are all "employees" without constituencies or
influence independent of the President's favor.  Their
overriding concern when engaging foreigners is to avoid the
appearance of overstepping or violating their instructions.
They are particularly cautious in the presence of other
Syrians; requests to meet one-on-one often yield more
expansive and candid responses.

¶7. (S/NF) Deceit:  SARG officials at every level lie.  They
persist in a lie even in the face of evidence to the
contrary.  They are not embarrassed to be caught in a lie.
While lower level officials often lie to avoid potential
punitive action from their own government, senior level
officials generally lie when they deem a topic too
"dangerous" to discuss (e.g., Al-Kibar, IAEA) or when they
have not yet determined whether or how to respond (FFN,
Hezbollah arms supplies, etc).  When a senior SARG official
is lying, the key challenge is not demonstrating  the lack of
veracity but discovering the true reasons for it.
¶8. (S/NF) Passivity:  SARG foreign policy is formulated in
response to external developments (changes in regional
leadership, initiatives from the West, etc).  The SARG does
not launch initiatives and generally seeks cover from allies
when exploring new courses of action.  The SARG is much more
confident on the Arab level than on the international level.
SARG policy responses are generally tactical and operational,
exploratory rather than decisive, oblique instead of direct.
Strategy, to the extent it exists, emerges from a series of
tactical choices.  The lack of initiative appears rooted in
an underlying sense of diplomatic powerlessness.  Every
foreign policy embarrassment in Syria's history lies under
the surface of a generally false projection of assertiveness.
 That assertiveness is sometimes read as arrogance. 

¶9.  (S/NF) Antagonism:  Every Syrian diplomatic relationship
contains an element of friction.  There is some current
friction, for example, in the Syrians' relations with the
Turks and the French.  The Syrians are not troubled by
discord; they seek an upper hand in any relationship by
relying on foreign diplomats' instinctive desire to resolve
problems. By withholding a solution, the SARG seeks to
control the pace and temperature of the relationship.  SARG
officials artificially restrict their availability  and can
engage in harsh verbal attacks to intimidate and rattle
foreign diplomats.  SARG officials delight in disparaging
their interlocutors behind their backs for allowing
themselves to be cowed.  On the international level, the
President has indulged in personal criticisms of foreign
leaders; unlike his father, he deliberately makes enemies
when he doesn't necessarily have to.  FM Muallim can behave
similarly but he probably does so on the President's
instructions. 

¶10. (S/NF) Complacency:  SARG leadership genuinely believes
that SARG foreign policy has been, is being, and will be
vindicated by events.  They also genuinely believe their
foreign policy is based on morally defensible and
intellectually solid principles, although it is usually
reactive and opportunistic.  Existing policy choices are
immutable unless the President decides to change them, in
which case, his new policies, despite any appearances to the
contrary, are consistent with "traditional" principles.
Baathism infuses foreign policy principles (Pan-Arabism) but
pragmatism is more important.  More recently, Bashar's like
or dislike of other leaders plays a role in policy
formulation. 

¶11. (S/NF) The Non Sequitur:  When Syrian officials don't
like a point that has been made to them, they frequently
resort to an awkward changes in subject to deflect perceived
criticism.  Syrian officials seem to think they've scored a
verbal hit by employing a facile non sequitur, usually in the
form of a counter-accusation.  When the SARG's human rights
record is raised with Muallim, for example, he often raises
Israel's December-January Gaza operation or, more recently,
asks if the U.S. will accept the 1300 Al Qaeda sympathizers
in Syrian jails.   The non sequitur is intended to stop
discussion of the unwelcome topic while subtly intimidating
the interlocutor with the threat of raising a subject that is
putatively embarrassing to him or her.  When the non sequitur
is deployed, it is clear that the SARG official is on the
defensive. 

¶12.  (S/NF) Comment:  Given the apparent dysfunctionality of
the SARG foreign policy apparatus and its weaknesses in terms
of depth and resources, the SARG's ability to punch above its
weight internationally is noteworthy.  Much of its strength
appears to lie in the talents of key individuals and their
ability to collaborate with each other, despite tensions and
rivalries.  SARG officials generally have clear, if tactical,
guidance from Bashar and they are sufficiently professional
to translate those instructions into recognizable diplomatic
practice.  But the behaviors they employ as diplomatic
"force-multipliers" are the hallmarks of a Syrian diplomatic
style that is at best abrasive and, at its worst, brutal.  At
the end of the day, there are few who really like to deal
with the Syrians.  The SARG, well aware of its reputation,
however,  spends much of its energy ensuring that we have to. 

CONNELLY

January 17, 2012 0

Maysaloon : A Response to Creative Syria’s Author

Sunday, January 15, 2012

Creative Syria has been relaunched with a fresh new look and an emphasis on the many crises that Syria is currently facing. Whilst the presentation of the site is excellent, the politics that are behind it will cause some consternation by Syrians who support the revolution. I do not intend to argue my own position in this post, instead I wish to critically examine the latest post, “Ten Reasons Why Many Syrians Are Not Interested Yet“, and see whether his opposition to the Syrian revolution is justified or not. He enumerates these reasons first and then expands on his arguments. Naturally, I will begin by examining each point and then dissecting the rest of his argument. Like Camille, I will also backup my arguments, and examine whether the sources he cites are justified or not, and whether they support his argument.

1. The first argument is that there are no true democracies. Citing the Economist Intelligence Unit’s democracy index, the idea that even the Arab world’s better examples are all “flawed democracies” seems to be enough of a reason that Syrians are not interested, but in what, that is not yet mentioned. Are Syrians not interested in democracy because there are no truly democratic Arab countries? Or perhaps they are not interested in the “revolution” because even those Arab countries that are said to be nominally democratic (like Iraq or Lebanon) are a mess? Regardless of what is intended by this thesis, it is clear from that same index that countries such as Lebanon (scoring 5.32) and Iraq (scoring 4.03), are still higher than Syria, which scored a paltry 1.99

This score is derived from several factors according to the Wikipedia article quoted: Whether elections are free and fair; the security of voters; the influence of foreign powers on government; the capability of civil servants to implement policies. The Democracy index then places Syria firmly in the “Authoritarian Regime” category.

It is interesting that the author of the Creative Syria piece does not see the widespread protests that have paralysed the country for almost a year as enough evidence that Syrians are in actual fact very interested regardless of the flawed examples of Arabic democracies cited. The unprecedented level of presidential “reforms” in the past year alone, concerning everything from national health insurance companies to offering additional points to students at technical colleges, is a sign that the government is very interested in the revolutions that are sweeping the Arab world. Perhaps those many Syrians that Camille is referring to should be interested in democracy regardless whether they think Iraq and Lebanon are flawed democracies.

2. Camille states that in 2010 Lebanon and Iraq were perceived to be more corrupt than Syria. That statement is simply not true. In 2010, Transparency International rated the Worldwide Corruption Perception of Syria and Lebanon as an equally atrocious 2.5 for each, whereas Iraq was rated with a marginally higher score of 1.5. You can see the scores here.

3. A problematic description of “formerly proud” Arab countries is used for countries that have underwent the drastic changes that Camille believes “many Syrians” are not interested in. I’m not quite sure how he gauges whether or not a country used to be “proud”. Iraq is described as a formerly leading Arab state, but I’m not sure how proud Iraqis felt of losing an entire generation (estimated at 300,000) in a war of aggression against Iran. Nor can we be sure how proud Libyans were before the overthrow of Gaddafi for us to snidely criticise Qatar’s assistance of the Libyan rebels and their NTC. Were they more or less proud when Gaddafi gave up his weapons programmes for inspection to the West, and agreed upon massive oil concessions to BP, whilst hugging Tony Blair during the infamous “deal in the desert” saga. Most tellingly, Camille admits that the political process in Iraq, in spite of that country’s occupation by the United States, could not proceed without consultations with Syria and Iraq. Obviously, and this is something conveniently ignored, this was because both Iran and Syria turned Iraq into their battlefield with the United States, which was the real reason for the atrocious levels of deaths amongst Iraqi civilians – apart from the American invasion and occupation. I’m not quite sure how valid an argument is when it depends on the “pride” of a nation. Especially in countries with such little transparency or scope for expressing genuine political opinion.

4. Yemen and Sudan are cited as examples of states that could be divided, and because three is a lucky number, I think Camille added Somalia – a curious and quite arbitrary addition. Yemen and Sudan, the most corrupt of Arab states, have been ruled by despots who will be judged by history to have been instrumental in dividing their states. The curious reversal of Omar Bashir’s opposition to the division of his country, and the stupidity of Ali Abdullah Saleh, who had to despatch a team to Libya to ask Gaddafi how to react to a revolution (the latter told him to start shooting, and Saleh’s forces promptly began firing at the crowds after an initial period of peaceful protest). Both of these countries are staunch allies of the Syrian regime, though the Syrian regime knows how brutally corrupt Saleh’s regime is, when a team sent by Rami Makhlouf (the Syrian president’s cousin) to negotiate a confidential deal in Yemen had to be flown out in secrecy in the dead of night when they were going to be forced to sign on Saleh’s terms. But what are such little niggles between friends, eh? These countries are risking being dismantled because of the incompetence of their rulers, so citing them as an example is slightly misleading, if not wilfully inaccurate.

5. We are told that women’s rights deteriorate after changes that allow Islamists a powerful role in the new state. That’s quite an interesting play on words when you think about it. These “changes” Camille refers to are revolutions which removed despots and families that had been in power for decades. It assumes that women’s rights were better prior to the revolution, whereas it is known that sexual harassment in Egypt reached epidemic proportions during Mubarak’s reign; Gaddafi’s vulgar use of virgin women “nuns of the revolution” and his importing of Italian women for his bunga bunga parties was on a par with Gulf potentates’ excess. Why is the case of Tawakul Karman and many other women in Yemen – perceived as a hotbed of Islamic fundamentalism – not cited as an example? Why, when ever Egyptian on the street in Tahrir square knows the revolution there is not over until the ruling military council, which is a continuation of Mubarak’s rule, is removed? Again, a skilful omission of such nuances gives us the picture that the Islamic bogeyman will wreak havoc with women’s rights in a region which already had a dismal record of women’s rights even under the supposedly secular dictatorships which have dominated them for decades. Furthermore, no mention is made of the Islamic Republic of Iran, a staunch ally of Syria and a country not without its own thriving pro-democracy movement, yet with a dismal respect for women’s rights. To capitalise on the plight of women in the Arab world and try to score cheap political points by claiming that it is a problem exclusively caused by political Islam – which is not true – is an ugly way that deflects from the real problems that women face in Arabic society.

6. The theme of the Islamic bogey man is continued in point six, where the issues of minorities is now discussed. Could somebody please explain to me where the Jewish minorities of Syria are? Or how the security situation in Iraq was deliberately undermined by both Iran and Syria to fight the Americans there by sending Islamists across the border? Another story from 2005 shows how the Syrian regime turned a blind eye to men who went to Iraq to carry out a jihad against the occupying American forces. Ironically more Iraqis (and especially people from Iraqi minorities) died as a result of this policy than actual American soldiers. It seems that the Syrian regime was not too concerned with women’s rights when it wanted to use Islamists, though it did not hesitate in discarding them just as quickly when they were no longer useful. When we are being frightened off by the Islamic bogeyman, we are being frightened from the Islamic extremism that is itself a product of regimes like those in Syria, and it is misleading to equate such groups with the politically Islamic groups that will now be forced to answer to a people that have not hesitated to topple far more brutal dictators. Far from being a reasonable precaution, using the Islamic bogeyman appears more useful for terrifying people into accepting the status quo of a dictator.

7. We are told that these “changes” that Camille warns against have come at the cost of enormous human casualties. For some very curious reason, he thinks that the Lebanese civil war is relevant to the Arab spring (it is not) and then ignores the role of Syria and Iran in Iraq, or the incompetence of Sudan’s regime, in the grotesque orgy of violence that those countries had to endure. In Libya, Gaddafi’s men were using anti-aircraft weapons to disperse crowds that had begun their protests peacefully, and the magical figure of 50,000 dead has now been conveniently used by those who lament the fall of Gaddafi and ignore the fact that if he was in the least bit concerned about the welfare of his country, and if he had allowed effective government institutions to be formed in his forty year long rule, then he should have resigned like any self-respecting ruler who has failed in his task. Instead, we are to blame the victim because a dictator did not step down and instead led his country into civil war.

8. We are told that change without a strong central authority leads to chaos and loss of instability. If this is supposed to be an argument against change then it fails. The strongly autocratic regimes that exist in the Arab world are so by design and not coincidence. Saddam Hussein threatened to turn Iraq into dust if he was to leave power, and so did Gaddafi. In an interview with the New York Times, Rami Makhouf, Assad’s cousin, said:

“We will sit here. We call it a fight until the end.” He added later, “They should know when we suffer, we will not suffer alone.”

If such an attitude by the very people that are supposed to care for the welfare of the country is not a good enough reason for change, then I do not know what is.

9. We are told that revolutions and civil wars will devastate the economy. That is true, but so will dictatorship and untrammelled power over half a century by powerful dictators and their corrupt families and supporters. In fact when you have decades of political and economic corruption, then a revolution or civil war will be inevitable. Just ask King Louis the XVI of France.

10. Finally, the oldest bogeyman of all is invoked – Israel. This is curious when we hear statements from Rami Makhlouf saying that:

“If there is no stability here, there’s no way there will be stability in Israel,”

This, again, is the Syrian president’s cousin and one of the richest men in Syria. Riad Seif, a Syrian member of Parliament, was arrested after he questioned the monopoly on mobile phone networks that was being cornered by Makhlouf and his family. At the start of the Syrian revolution, analysts questioned whether Makhlouf was being offered as a sacrificial goat to deflect from public anger at the political and economic corruption of the Assad regime. For the regime to distance itself from Makhlouf’s comments to the New York Times does not fit with how closely associated this man is to the regime and its interests.

At the end of these ten points we are given a chart with information that is unsourced, and appears to be compiled from information that is not verifiable. A blurb in a red box presents the erroneous assumptions listed above as fact, and proof that most Syrians believe removing Assad is a bad idea. The author then proceeds to rubbish and character assassinate the Syrian opposition figures, and selectively lists sources which do so. Conveniently ignored is the glaring problem that the reliance on such technology is precisely because the Assad regime prevents dissent, brutalises political dissidents, and attempts to crush any sign of dissent with Assad’s rule. The fact that the Assad family has been in power for forty years, and still finds freedom of information, assembly and basic communications technology as a threat to be banned and censored, shows how dismally they have failed in their responsibility to the Syrian people. It begs the question of whether they should be given the benefit of the doubt and allowed time for more “reforms”.

To conclude, the piece on Creative Syria does not tell us on what basis “many” Syrians are wary of change – any more than the opposition tells us that most Syrians are against Assad’s rule. It also gives ten flimsy, and quite sophistic arguments as to why Syrians are allegedly not interested in the revolution. If Camille intended to make the case for why negotiation and peaceful discussion should be the way forward in this impasse, then, sadly, he has failed dismally.

Source

January 16, 2012 0