DAMASCUS — Syria on Thursday charged 32 demonstrators with attacking the reputation of the state a day after they joined a rally calling for the release of political prisoners, a rights group said.
The 32 protesters, including rights activist Suhair Atassi, were detained on Wednesday at a Damascus rally organised by the relatives of political prisoners to petition for their release.
“The Syrian authorities on Thursday charged 32 activists who took part in protest outside the interior ministry with attacking the reputation of the state, provoking racism and sectarianism and damaging relations between Syrians,” the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said.
The rights group listed the names of 25 detained demonstrators, including Atassi and four relatives of opposition figure Kamal Labwani, who is serving a 12-year jail sentence.
It said security services broke up the sit-in “by force.”
Syrian rights groups have repeatedly urged the authorities to free prisoners of conscience and to stop arbitrary detention of political opponents and civil society activists.
They have also called for a law on political parties “to enable citizens to exercise their right to participate in managing the affairs of the country.”
On Thursday five protesters detained at Wednesday’s rally were freed, a rights group said amid international calls for more to be released.
Human Rights Watch called for the release of all demonstrators, estimating that at least 34 people were arrested based on a list compiled by participants.
“Instead of beating families of Syria?s political prisoners, President (Basgar) al-Assad should be reuniting them with their loved ones,” said Sarah Leah Whitson, HRW’s Middle East director.
HRW quoted one released activist as saying security services had asked those arrested for their Facebook passwords.
Whitson said if Assad “is serious about reform, he should hold his security services to account.
“Syrians deserve no less than the Egyptians and Tunisians who finally succeeded in forcing their political leadership to disband the feared state security services.”
France on Thursday condemned violence against protesters in Damascus, and the United States called on Syria to exercise restraint.
Joshua M. Landis, Director of the Center for Middle East Studies and Associate Professor of Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Oklahoma and writer of the a daily newsletter blog Syria Comment on Syrian politics answered ORSAM’s questions on Syrian foreign policy, regional politics, peace process and relations of Syria with Israel, Lebanon and Turkey.
ORSAM: To start with Syrian foreign policy in general, it is usually analyzed with neo-realist considerations, omnibalancing approach rests on regime survival concerns, historical sociology pays attention to the levels of state formation or political economy. What do you think are the main determinants of Syrian foreign policy?
Joshua M. Landis: All regimes and countries defend themselves. This is not shocking and shouldn’t be a revelation in explaining the behavior of Syria’s leadership.
For example, Tony Blair has revealed in his recently published memoirs that Vice President Cheney was deadly serious in his ambition to bring down the Syrian state following Washington’s successful destruction of the Iraqi state. It is in this light that we can understand Syria’s determination to assist the emergence of an Iraqi resistance that could frustrate Washington’s further designs of regime destruction in the region.
In the Middle East, the link between political machinations, espionage and assassination is either clear as day, or clear as mud.
As for the yet unsolved case of the February 2005 murder of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, mud might be giving way to daylight.
A crackdown on Israeli spy rings operating in Lebanon has resulted in more than 70 arrests over the past 18 months. Included among them are four high-ranking Lebanese Army and General Security officers—one having spied for the Mossad since 1984.
A significant breakthrough in the ongoing investigation occurred in late June and culminated in the arrest of Charbel Qazzi, head of transmission and broadcasting at Alfa, one of Lebanon’s two state-owned mobile service providers.
According to the Lebanese daily As-Safir, Qazzi confessed to installing computer programs and planting electronic chips in Alfa transmitters. These could then be used by Israeli intelligence to monitor communications, locate and target individuals for assassination, and potentially deploy viruses capable of erasing recorded information in the contact lines. Qazzi’s collaboration with Israel reportedly dates back 14 years.
On July 12, a second arrest at Alfa was made. Tarek al-Raba’a, an engineer and partner of Qazzi, was apprehended on charges of spying for Israel and compromising national security. A few days later, a third Alfa employee was similarly detained.
Israel has refused to comment on the arrests. Nevertheless, their apparent ability to have penetrated Lebanon’s military and telecommunication sectors has rattled the country and urgently raised security concerns.
What does any of this have to do with the Hariri assassination?
Outside the obvious deleterious ramifications of high-ranking Lebanese military officers working for Israel, the very legitimacy of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) is now in question. The STL is the U.N.-sanctioned body tasked with prosecuting those responsible for the assassination of the late prime minister. On Feb. 14, 2005, 1,000 kg of explosives detonated near Hariri’s passing motorcade, killing him and 21 others.
It is believed the STL will issue indictments in the matter as early as September—relying heavily on phone recordings and mobile transmissions to do so.
According to the AFP, “A preliminary report by the U.N. investigating team said it had collected data from mobile phone calls made the day of Hariri’s murder as evidence.”
The National likewise reported, “The international inquiry, which could present indictments or findings as soon as September, according to unverified media reports, used extensive phone records to draw conclusions into a conspiracy to kill Hariri, widely blamed on Syria and its Lebanese allies …”
In a July 16 televised speech, Hezbollah Secretary-General Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah speculated the STL would use information gleaned from Israeli-compromised communications to falsely implicate the group in the prime minister’s murder:
“Some are counting in their analysis of the (STL) indictment on witnesses, some of whom turned out to be fake, and on the telecommunications networks which were infiltrated by spies who can change and manipulate data.
“Before the (2006) war, these spies gave important information to the Israeli enemy and based on this information, Israel bombed buildings, homes, factories and institutions. Many martyrs died and many others were wounded. These spies are partners in the killings, the crimes, the threats and the displacement.”
Nasrallah called the STL’s manipulation an “Israeli project” meant to “create an uproar in Lebanon.”
Indeed, in May 2008 Lebanon experienced a taste of this. At the height of an 18-month stalemate over the formation of a national unity government under then Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, his cabinet’s decision to unilaterally declare Hezbollah’s fixed-line communication system illegal pushed the country to the brink of civil war.
Recognizing the value their secure lines of communication had in combating the July 2006 Israeli invasion and suspecting that state-owned telecoms might be compromised, Hezbollah resisted Siniora’s plans to have its network dismantled. Their men swept through West Beirut and put a quick end to the government’s plan. Two years later, their suspicions appear to have been vindicated.
Opposition MP and Free Patriotic Movement head Michel Aoun has already warned Nasrallah that the STL will likely indict “uncontrolled” Hezbollah members to be followed by “… Lebanese-Lebanese and Lebanese-Palestinian tension, and by an Israeli war on Lebanon.”
Giving credence to Nasrallah and Aoun’s assertions, Commander in Chief of the Israel Defense Forces Gabi Ashkenazi, predicted “with lots of wishes” that the situation in Lebanon would deteriorate in September after the STL indicts Hezbollah for Hariri’s assassination.
Ashkenazi’s gleeful, prescient testimony to the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs Committee betrays what Israel hopes the fallout from the STL’s report will be: fomentation of civil strife and discord among Lebanon’s sectarian groups, generally divided into pro- and anti-Syria factions. Ashkenazi anticipates this to happen, of course, because he knows Israel’s unfettered access to critical phone records will have framed Hezbollah for the crime.
Israel’s agents and operatives in Lebanon and its infiltration of a telecom network have been exposed. At the very least, the STL must recognize that evidence of alleged Hezbollah involvement in Hariri’s death (a group that historically enjoyed good ties with the late premier) is wholly tainted and likely doctored.
The arrest of Qazzi and al-Raba’a in the breakup of Israeli spy rings should prompt the STL to shift its focus to the only regional player that has benefited from Hariri’s murder; one that will continue to do so if and when their designs to implicate Hezbollah are realized.
It is time to look at Tel Aviv.
Rannie Amiri is an independent Middle East commentator. He may be reached at: rbamiri [at] yahoo [dot] com.
Politically explosive films and television series from Syria are storming the Arab market. Now the film “The Long Night” – the first Syrian feature film to highlight the fate of political prisoners – has become ensnared in the censorship process. It is nevertheless reaching its audience via satellite television – even in Syria. Susanne Schanda reports
“Sensitive political subject”: although the censors were full of praise for “The Long Night”, they passed it on to a higher authority for consideration
Four men in blue prison gear with unkempt grey hair and stubble sit in their cell drinking tea. The light is crepuscular, the plaster is peeling off the walls. They have been behind bars for 20 years for criticising the regime. Karim is the oldest, he stays lying down on his metal bed and has his tea brought to him. He is resigned to his fate. Then the heavy iron door swings open, and out of all the men it is Karim who is ordered to pack his things and go with the guards. He is being released.
The opening scenes of “The Long Night” are almost wordless, and there is no music to break the silence. We watch as Karim washes himself, as the guards shave him and cut his hair. Then suddenly he’s out on the street, in a shirt and suit, a leather bag in his hand – he sniffs the air, and takes in his surroundings with amazement.
The film by Haitham Hakki, one of Syria’s best-known filmmakers, does not focus on prison conditions or the arbitrary nature of detentions. It deals instead with members of the released prisoner’s family, who have come to an arrangement with the regime and made their compromises.
The unexpected release of Karim throws their lives into confusion, and triggers recriminations and feelings of remorse.
“I am concerned with the human drama, the film does not operate with political slogans,” says Haitham Hakki in an interview with Qantara.de in Damascus. He wrote the screenplay himself. Once this was approved by the censors, the film could be made in Syria with Syrian actors, under the supervision of star director Hatem Ali.
But the film required further authorisation before it could go on general release in Syrian cinemas. “The censors were full of praise for the film, but because of the sensitive political subject they passed it on to a higher authority for consideration. That was about six months ago. I’ve heard nothing since,” says the author.
“The censors can’t shut down the universe”: Syrian scriptwriter and filmmaker Haitham Hakki
Nevertheless, in an era of globalised satellite television, the long arm of the censor is actually not that long at all: “It’s only a matter of time before Syrian audiences will also be able to see the film,” says Haitham Hakki, who produced the film for the Saudi production company Orbit. “Orbit will soon be broadcasting the film on a cable broadcaster. Then we’ll sell it on to other television stations, and it’ll soon be broadcast everywhere, even in Syria. The censors can’t shut down the universe.” “The Long Night” has already been shown at numerous film festivals and honoured with prizes, for example in Cairo, Delhi and Taormina.
Close to the taboo zones
Haitham Hakki is a decidedly political filmmaker. Has he ever been sent to prison for his views? He waves his hand in negation: “No, but I know many families who have suffered similar tragedies.” He is unimpressed by films that propagate a direct political message, and says that in any case, it would not be possible to make such a film in Syria.
Some Arab critics have accused him of taking a clear-cut stance against the government in “The Long Night”. Hakki, who describes himself as a social democrat, says: “That doesn’t interest me. My social dramas are always political, even if they’re not explicitly about politics. If you want to instigate change, you draw back the veil on society’s failings. That is political in itself.”
Ten years ago, the censorship process in Syria was considerably more stringent than it is today. When the new government of Bashar al-Assad came to power following the death of his father Hafez al-Assad in the year 2000, the change ushered in a period of liberalisation. But what became known as the Damascus Spring was short-lived. Artists, writers and filmmakers have now learned how to circumvent censorship and express criticism without calling a spade a spade.
“Then suddenly he’s out on the street”: “The Long Night” deals with members of the released prisoner’s family, who have come to an arrangement with the regime and made their compromises
Haitham Hakki explains that there are red lines that are not to be crossed, but it’s not always clear where they have been drawn. Sometimes a decision can depend on the mood or the character of the official responsible at the time. Generally in the Arab world, the three main taboos apply: sex, religion and politics. “But it’s not possible to make any film without at least touching upon these issues,” says Hakki. “I always manoeuvre in very close proximity to these taboo zones and continually try and broaden their acceptance.”
New stimuli from the Syrian film and television industry
Just like Egypt, Syria also has its fair share of cheap and cheerful soap operas, but the nation also has a proud tradition of television series that weave more challenging subjects into their storylines such as social problems and modern Syrian history; or Arab issues such as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the situation in Iraq – an approach that is popular with audiences.
Since 1980, the 61-year-old director, scriptwriter and producer Haitham Hakki has made numerous political and socially explosive feature films and television series. He has often had to wait years for permission to screen them. For example, for the 23-part series “Khan al-Harir” (“Silk Market”) by the writer Nihad Siris, directed by Hakki. The censorship authorities withheld the screenplay for two years, until permission to go ahead with filming eventually came in 1996.
The story of love and trade in the souq of Aleppo highlights the negative impact of the Syrian-Egyptian union of 1958-61. “The government didn’t like that,” Hakki suspects. “But in the end, authorities even allowed the series to go out during the most advantageous period for broadcasts – the fasting month of Ramadan. It was a huge success and was later shown again several times.”
After “Khan al-Harir” came increasing numbers of Syrian television series and films that were huge hits beyond national borders across the Arab world. This success posed a threat to the Egyptian film industry, which had dominated the market up to that point. “We brought a cinematographic perspective to the series, filmed with just one camera at locations outside the studio, and chose brazen subjects,” Hakki explains the strategy. Previously, television series production had been restricted to the studio. “It looked like filmed theatre and bored people,” he says.
Financial boost from liberal Arab satellite broadcasters
Apart from the inspiration and courage of Syrian filmmakers, the emergence of satellite broadcasters in the Gulf States from the mid-1990s also played a key role in enhancing the popularity of Syrian series. It meant more money had now come into play.
Increasing numbers of Syrian television series and films are huge hits beyond national borders across the Arab world. Pictured: star director Hatem Ali
MBC, Rotana and Orbit are the best-known Arab media concerns investing robustly in feature films and series. “Previously, when there were only local broadcasters in each individual country, we had to sell each series to around 20 foreign broadcasters to recoup the money we’d invested. Now the lion’s share of the financing comes from the media concerns in the Gulf, which are owned by Saudi princes or businesspeople,” says Hakki.
As for what influence or even censorship is exerted on the part of the investors, this is extremely small. Hakki concedes that there were initially some problems with the Kingdom’s strict moral codes, but now that most of the broadcasters have relocated abroad, companies run by Saudis are the most liberal in the Arab world. “Those who invest large amounts of money want to see profit, and ideological questions are of secondary importance,” he says soberly.
So, the fact that the censor’s knife no longer reaches the controversial objects of desire looks to be less a case of political intention, and more a side effect of competition between satellite broadcasters in a realm where the sky’s the limit. “‘The Long Night’ is the best example of that,” confirms Haitham Hakki.
Syria is host to the third largest number of refugees in the world, and the greatest number in the Arab world. Will that situation last, asks Bassel Oudat in Damascus
A decade ago, the UN General Assembly chose 20 June to mark World Refugee Day. On that day we are encouraged to focus on the problems and issues of refugees and others internally displaced in their home countries. According to statistics from the UNHCR, the UN refugee agency, Syria is first among Arab country and number three worldwide — following Iran and Pakistan — in terms of hosting refugees. At present it accounts for six per cent of the world’s refugees, mostly Palestinians and Iraqis, but also from Sudan, Afghanistan and Somalia. In fact, 10 per cent of Syria’s population are refugees.
Ten years after opening its doors to Arab refugees, especially Palestinians and Iraqis, these communities have noticeably grown in number inside Syria, putting strain on those providing them with assistance. Over the years, especially during tough times, these communities have been a burden on the Syrian government in terms of assimilating them and meeting their basic needs.
The first wave of refugees to Syria was in 1948 after the creation of the State of Israel, when hundreds of thousands left or were forced to leave Palestine. Syria received 85,000 Palestinian refugees at the time, according to the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA). This was followed by several waves of refugees after the 1967 war, bloating the number of Palestinians in Syria to more than 450,000.
Syria was also host to tens of thousands of the Iraqi opposition who fled Saddam Hussein’s regime. Starting in 2003, after Saddam’s regime was toppled, Syria became the destination of 1.5 million Iraqi refugees who were either fleeing the US war and unsafe conditions in Iraq or fleeing persecution and arbitrary detention.
Over the past few decades, several thousand refugees from a variety of other Arab states have entered Syria, including Sudan and Somalia. A few hundred Afghanis and Ahwaz from Iran also sought refuge in Syria, bringing the number of refugees to nearly two million. The problems of Arab refugees in Syria are directly connected to their home countries, and their numbers fluctuate depending on security conditions back home. Palestinian refugees, for example, are directly linked to Arab-Israeli peace and inter-Palestinian relations. As for Iraqi refugees, their situation depends on the security situation in Iraq and political conflicts amongst Iraqis.
The Syrian government has dealt with the issue of refugees in a special way, taking into consideration national bonds and humanitarian conditions on the one hand and political interests on the other. Meanwhile, Syria’s security apparatus closely monitors the movements of all refugees within its borders.
Palestinian refugees are prohibited from acquiring the Syrian nationality in order to uphold Palestinian identity. Around 25 per cent of these refugees live in 10 official refugee camps, while another 25 per cent reside in three unofficial camps that Syrian security forces are in charge of guarding. The remaining 50 per cent of refugees live in various Syrian cities. Palestinian refugees have the right to attend government schools and universities for free, and are entitled to free healthcare in government hospitals. They are permitted to work in both the public and private sectors, and become civil servants. They perform their military service with the Palestine Liberation Army, in liaison with the Syrian armed forces. They are allowed to own one residence, but no agricultural land. Altogether, they have almost all the rights of Syrian citizens, including holding senior government posts other than political positions. Damascus has also given them permanent residency without the need for renewal, as well as special passports making Syria their guarantor while travelling abroad.
The Iraqis, on the other hand, are allowed to own property and invest in the economy, but they are not given permanent residency and they are required to renew their stay every three months and in some exceptional cases once a year. Iraqi students can attended Syrian schools for free, and are eligible for free healthcare in government hospitals. However, they need work permits for employment. The UNHCR has opened special offices to assist them in all aspects of life. In fact, the UNHCR opened the largest refugee camp in the world in Duma in eastern Damascus.
Syria is also responsible for ensuring the proper infrastructure is in place to support two million transient residents. Consequently, it has endured electricity and water shortages as a result of large numbers of Iraqis arriving over a short period of time. Meanwhile, the education and job sectors have suffered from an overload of large numbers of unexpected beneficiaries.
While Syria’s rationale for taking in Arab refugees who have suffered from wars is rooted in humanitarian and Arab nationalist reasoning, Damascus has tried to reap some political gains from this. It wants to become a regional powerhouse with influence on issues pertaining to these refugees. On the Palestinian issue, it has become a main player, especially that the leaders of most political and military Palestinian factions chose to set up shop in Damascus. These include the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and general leadership, and later Hamas, the Islamic Jihad and other Palestinian resistance groups. Most of these groups, with the exception of the PLO, closely coordinate their political and public policies with Damascus.
Syria has rejected US pressure to expel the leadership of Palestinian resistance groups from its land, insisting that their media, political and social work in Syria is part of their expression of the ambitions of the Palestinian refugee community. Syria has also hosted leading figures from Iraq’s Baath Party that oppose the US occupation of Iraq and the incumbent Iraqi regime. Also, a large number of Iraqi tribal elders and senior officers from the dissolved Iraqi armed forces were allowed to continue their activities in Syria, and remain politically coordinated with Damascus once they returned to Iraq to participate in the political process there.
Today, Syria has influential allies inside Iraq, and has vehemently refused to hand over to the incumbent Baghdad government any members of the Iraqi Baath Party or leaders of the former Iraqi army that are accused of plotting military operations inside Iraq.
No doubt, Syria has carried the burden of hosting two million Arab refugees and has given some of them rights that they would not receive in any other country. It welcomed them with open arms and did not force them to leave, despite their large volume that has strained the Syrian economy and living conditions.
The return of the Palestinian refugees from Syria to Palestine has become a complicated issue, and their case represents an uphill struggle towards any possible solution. The same is true of Iraqi refugees, some who have been in Syria for seven years. The Syrian burden continues to grow, and although Syrian hospitality has been extended, this does not mean that Damascus may not change its posture towards them. This is especially true if their continued presence threatens Syria’s national security.
band annie's Weblog 