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Egypt

Gaza: Crushed between Israel and Egypt

                    on October 2, 2013 35

An empty smuggling tunnels in Rafah, Gaza. (Photo: Marius Arnesen)

An empty tunnel in Rafah, Gaza. (Photo: Marius Arnesen)

The furor over the recent chemical weapons attack in Syria has overshadowed disturbing events to the south, as Egypt’s generals wage a quiet war of attrition against the Hamas leadership in Gaza.

Hamas has found itself increasingly isolated, politically and geographically, since the Egyptian army ousted the country’s first democratically elected president, Mohammed Morsi, in early July.

Hamas is paying the price for its close ties to Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic movement that briefly took power through the ballot box following the revolutionary protests that toppled dictator Hosni Mubarak in 2011.

Since the army launched its coup three months ago, jailing the Brotherhood’s leadership and last week outlawing the movement’s activities and freezing its assets, Hamas has become a convenient scapegoat for all signs of unrest.

Hamas is blamed for the rise of militant Islamic groups in the Sinai, many drawn from disgruntled local Bedouin tribes, which have been attacking soldiers, government institutions and shipping through the Suez canal. The army claims a third of the Islamists it has killed in recent operations originated from Gaza.

At an army press conference last month, several Palestinians “confessed”  to smuggling arms from Gaza into Sinai, while an Egyptian commander, Ahmed Mohammed Ali, accused Hamas of “targeting the Egyptian army through ambushes.”

The Egyptian media have even tied Hamas to a car bombing in Cairo last month which nearly claimed the life of the new interior minister, Mohammed Ibrahim.

Lurking in the shadows is the army’s fear that, should the suppressed Muslim Brotherhood choose the path of violence, it may find a useful ally in a strong Hamas.

A crackdown on the Palestinian Islamic movement has been all but inevitable, and on a scale even Mr Mubarak would have shrunk from. The Egyptian army has intensified the blockade along Egypt’s single short border with Gaza, replicating that imposed by Israel along the other three.

Over the past weeks, the army has destroyed hundreds of tunnels through which Palestinians smuggle fuel and other necessities in short supply because of Israel’s siege.

Egypt has bulldozed homes on its side to establish a “buffer zone”, as Israel did inside Gaza a decade ago when it still occupied the enclave directly, to prevent more tunnels being dug.

That has plunged Gaza’s population into hardship, and dealt a harsh blow to the tax revenues Hamas raises on the tunnel trade. Unemployment is rocketing and severe fuel shortages mean even longer power cuts.

Similarly, Gaza’s border crossing with Egypt at Rafah – the only access to the outside for most students, medical patients and business people – is now rarely opened, even to the Hamas leadership.

And the Egyptian navy has been hounding Palestinians trying to fish off Gaza’s coast, in a zone already tightly delimited by Israel. Egypt has been firing at boats and arresting crews close to its territorial waters, citing security.

Fittingly, a recent cartoon in a Hamas newspaper showed Gaza squeezed between pincers – one arm Israel, the other Egypt. Sami Abu Zuhri, a Hamas spokesperson, was recently quoted saying Egypt was “trying to outmatch the Israelis in tormenting and starving our people”.

Hamas is short of regional allies. Its leader Khaled Meshal fled his Syrian base early in the civil war, alienating Iran in the process. Other recent supporters, such as Turkey and Qatar, are also keeping their distance.

Hamas fears mounting discontent in Gaza, and particularly a demonstration planned for November modelled on this summer’s mass protests in Egypt that helped to bring down Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood.

Hamas’ political rival, Fatah – and the Palestinian Authority, based in the West Bank – are reported to be behind the new protest movement.

The prolonged efforts by Fatah and Hamas to strike a unity deal are now a distant memory. In late August the PA annnounced it would soon be taking “painful decisions” about Hamas, assumed to be a reference to declaring it a “rogue entity” and thereby cutting off funding.

The PA sees in Hamas’ isolation and its own renewed ties to the Egyptian leadership a chance to take back Gaza.

As ever, Israel is far from an innocent bystander.

After the unsettling period of Muslim Brotherhood rule, the Egyptian and Israeli armies – their strategic interests always closely aligned – have restored security cooperation. According to media reports, Israel even lobbied Washington following the July coup to ensure Egypt continued to receive generous US aid handouts – as with Israel, mostly in the form of military assistance.

Israel has turned a blind eye to Egypt pouring troops, as well as tanks and helicopters, into Sinai in violation of the 1979 peace treaty. Israel would rather Egypt mop up the Islamist threat on their shared doorstep.

The destruction of the tunnels, meanwhile, has sealed off the main conduit by which Hamas armed itself against future Israeli attacks.

Israel is also delighted to see Fatah and Hamas sapping their energies in manoeuvring against each other. Political unity would have strengthened the Palestinians’ case with the international community; divided, they can be easily played off against the other.

That cynical game is in full swing. A week ago Israel agreed for the first time in six years to allow building materials into Gaza for private construction, and to let in more fuel. A newly approved pipe will double the water supply to Gaza.

These measures are designed to bolster the PA’s image in Gaza, as payback for returning to the current futile negotiations, and undermine support for Hamas.

With Egypt joining the blockade, Israel now has much firmer control over what goes in and out, allowing it to punish Hamas while improving its image abroad by being generous with “humanitarian” items for the wider population.

Gaza is dependent again on Israel’s good favor. But even Israeli analysts admit the situation is far from stable. Sooner or later, something must give. And Hamas may not be the only ones caught in the storm.

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Mubarak Eyes Release As Egyptian Military Continues To Kill Protestors

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Why is the Egyptian regime demonizing Palestinians?

                    on August 19, 2013 13

Palestinians know that if Cairo sneezes then Palestine, especially Gaza, is first to get the flu. Indeed, Gaza often serves as a tool of regime policy, as was the case during the Mubarak years and during the short-lived government led by the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party, and is still the case with the current regime since July 2013.

The Mubarak regime’s policy towards Gaza was generally repressive. It participated in Israel’s draconian siege of the enclave, underway since 2006, and was fully complicit in Israel’s brutal offensive against Gaza in 2008-9. Former Egyptian foreign minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit was standing next to his Israeli counterpart Tzipi Livni when she declared war on Gaza during her visit to Cairo in 2008.

Aboul Gheit went so far as to threaten to break the legs of the Palestinians of Gaza if they “encroached on Egypt’s national security” after they breached the border wall with Egypt, seeking to buy medicines and other necessary supplies in Al-Arish City. Naturally, such a repressive policy had to involve demonization of the Gaza Palestinians, painting them all as members of Hamas.

Hamas had great expectations of change after the downfall of the Mubarak regime, including the permanent opening of the Rafah Crossing and the free passage of people and goods, thus eliminating the need for the tunnels connecting Gaza to Egypt. Some optimists further hoped that the efforts for reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah would finally bear fruit, given that the Mubarak regime had been biased towards Fatah.

However, the transitional rule by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) that took power after Mubarak’s downfall did not lift the siege on Gaza or change the Egyptian political approach to Palestine. The tunnels continued to ply their trade to compensate for the massive shortage of supplies blocked by Israel. The Rafah Crossing was partially opened for very limited periods of time, depriving 1.7 million Palestinians of the basic right of freedom of movement.

The high hopes were therefore deferred until the Egyptian presidential elections. Palestinians believed that a democratically elected president would have the power to take sovereign decisions and implement the nationalist and Islamist position of ending the blockade on the Gaza Strip, revisiting the Camp David Accords, and responding to the Palestinian Call For Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions until Israel abided by international law. Some even believed that the newly elected president’s first trip abroad would be to Gaza. Ironically, the first visit Mohamed Morsi made after his election was to Saudi Arabia, which had been hostile to the Egyptian revolution; a visit to Gaza was never in the cards.

In fact, the Muslim Brotherhood was unable to rise to the challenge of government. They came late to the January 25 revolution, seeking first to appease the Mubarak regime. They then forged a temporary alliance with the SCAF and endorsed some of its most violent actions, including the October 2011 assault on peaceful demonstrators, many of them Egyptian Copts, protesting the demolition of a church in Upper Egypt. Once in government, they lacked a clear political vision; one could have easily mistaken the president’s speeches for a Friday sermon or an address by a tribal leader.

On the home front, the Brotherhood failed to make even limited progress in realizing the demands of the January 25 revolution for bread, freedom, social justice, and human dignity. The economy nearly collapsed and security worsened. Radical Islamist Takfiri groups increased their hold in the Sinai and Israel appears to freely wander through the area, to the extent of reportedly abducting a Palestinian there this June. Despite this reality, the Gaza Palestinians are forced to pay the price of any criminal act that takes place in Sinai.

The Brotherhood’s slogans against Israel – such as “we shall march to Jerusalem in our millions” – and the United States disappeared after they came to power. Instead, it adopted a pragmatic position well to the right of the political spectrum. Pragmatism meant a commitment to international agreements, a special relationship with the U.S., loans from the International Monetary Fund, and diplomatic ties with Israel.

There was no attempt to abrogate the 1979 peace treaty nor even to put it to a popular referendum. On the contrary, a few months into his term, Morsi sent a very friendly letter to Israeli President Shimon Peres regarding the appointment of the new Egyptian ambassador to Tel Aviv. He described Peres as his “great and good friend” and expressed his “strong desire to develop the cordial ties” between the two countries. Meanwhile, the blockade against Gaza was tightened: Almost all the tunnels were shut down and the Rafah Crossing functioned at a snail’s pace.

The Morsi presidency took credit for brokering a ceasefire agreement between Palestinian factions and Israel in November 2012 but failed to intervene to hold Israel to its commitments, including lifting the blockade against Gaza. The fact that Morsi’s Egypt did not stand by Gaza during that short but ruthless war that killed more than 200 Palestinians, mostly civilians, was a bitter disappointment to the Palestinian leadership in Gaza, especially as Palestinian fighters had successfully stood their ground against the Israeli onslaught and had expected political gains as a result.

Instead, Morsi capitalized on his “victorious” mediator role to achieve his aims at home. Just three days after the war on Gaza ended he issued his notorious Constitutional Declaration giving himself powers unprecedented in Egypt’s modern history.

In short, Mubarak’s policy toward the Palestinian cause and especially toward Gaza was passed on to the Brotherhood, which did not dare challenge the crime against humanity taking place on Egypt’s border – a crime that human rights organizations and the United Nations have condemned as collective punishment with some saying it amounted to slow genocide. The victimized Palestinians were asked to be “understanding” of the transitional period that the Brotherhood needed and not to demand the impossible, as if opening the Rafah Crossing for the passage of people and goods was an impossibly heroic act.

The Egyptian military regime in power since July 3, 2013 is now demonizing everything Palestinian. The Gaza Strip is facing a far harsher blockade affecting all the crossings, including an almost complete closure of the Rafah Crossing and destruction of the tunnels. An unprecedented incitement campaign is underway in several Egyptian media outlets, especially those financed by businessmen affiliated to the Mubarak regime and some Gulf countries hostile to the January 25 revolution. Palestinians are regularly excoriated on Egyptian TV. Some commentators are gleeful over the fate awaiting Gaza’s Palestinians while others assert Hamas’s involvement in Egypt’s internal affairs and call on the Egyptian Army to launch a military attack against the Gaza Strip. Some even “accuse” Morsi of being of Palestinian origin.

Once again, the Palestinians have become the target of the Egyptian authorities’ security complex: They are the weakest link in the Arab chain and have no strong government to represent them. They are regularly harassed at and deported from Egyptian airports and crossings, even if they are simply transiting to and from Gaza. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) has issued no statement calling on the Egyptian government to alleviate the stifling blockade or ensure decent treatment of Palestinian passengers. On the contrary, the PLO and particularly Fatah are rejoicing over the Brotherhood’s downfall and the difficulties this will pose for Hamas. Meanwhile, the Gaza government now faces an impasse and has no idea how to respond.

There is no doubt that this chauvinistic campaign to hold Gaza responsible for all of Egypt’s ills – from the fuel shortages to terrorism in Sinai – serves the feloul (remnants) of Mubarak’s regime, who are now in full resurgence. It is very disturbing that Egypt’s progressive voices have been silent in this regard, with some notable exceptions, even though all Palestinians, at both the official and popular levels, have condemned the terrorist acts in Sinai.

Moreover, no evidence has been found of Palestinian involvement in Egypt, including Sinai. Even if there had been, the collective punishment the Egyptian authorities are applying against the Palestinians of Gaza violates international law. By contrast, Egypt did not cut diplomatic ties with Israel, threaten military intervention, nor impose any restraints on Israelis visiting Egypt despite the many Israeli crimes against Egypt since the Camp David Accords, including the killing of five Egyptian soldiers in an Israeli airstrike in 2011.

Besides, isn’t Sinai a problem of Egypt’s making? Everyone knows that Mubarak’s regime neglected the Sinai, treating its population as second-class citizens and denying them essential services even though they are Egypt’s first line of defense. Gaza is a natural extension of the Sinai Peninsula and is therefore also part of Egypt’s national security. It is vital that the valiant Egyptian revolutionaries that brought down the Mubarak regime stand up to that regime’s feloul and their counter-revolution, which is using Palestine as a scapegoat.

There is no question that the Egyptian people as a whole remain passionately committed to Palestine and its people, despite the best efforts of the feloul. This spirit was captured in the statement issued by several intellectuals and politicians protesting the media campaign targeting the Palestinian people, demanding that the government clarify “Egypt’s policy and commitments toward the Palestinian people,” and calling on the government to preserve “all the rights of Palestinians in Egypt.”

The Egypt we want and the Egypt we need is a pluralistic, democratic and free Egypt with full sovereignty over its territory from its western border with Libya to its eastern border with Palestine, an Egypt that honors the principles for which so many laid down their lives in the January 25 revolution.

This article was first published by Al Shabaka: The Palestinian Policy Network.

About Haidar Eid

Haidar Eid is Associate Professor of Postcolonial and Postmodern Literature at Gaza’s al-Aqsa University. He has written widely on the Arab-Israeli conflict, including articles published at Znet, Electronic Intifada, Palestine Chronicle, and Open Democracy. He has published papers on cultural Studies  and literature in a number of journals, including Nebula, Journal of American Studies in Turkey, Cultural Logic, and the Journal of Comparative Literature.

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Bloodshed in Egypt: No End In Sight

       

With corpses filling Cairo’s streets and both sides vowing to escalate, any glimmers of revolutionary hope have been all but extinguished.

   

 


A trampled poster of Egypt’s ousted President Mohammed Morsi is seen on the ground outside the Rabaah al-Adawiya mosque, where supporters of Morsi had a protest camp in Nasr City, Cairo, Egypt, Friday, August 16, 2013. (AP Photo/Hassan Ammar)

Cairo at night has become a city of silence. Once among the world’s most crowded and raucous nocturnal metropolises, it is now home to ghosts, a place haunted by fear and despair. Never ones to abide by past military-imposed curfews, Egyptians stay indoors after sunset. The night is owned by helicopters roaming the skies, fat army tanks sitting heavily in the streets and bands of men wielding knives, clubs and guns at makeshift checkpoints. The occasional crackle of gunfire rings out, a reminder that the violence has only slowed, not stopped.

About the Author

Sharif Abdel Kouddous
Sharif Abdel Kouddous is an independent journalist based in Cairo. He is a Democracy Now! correspondent and a fellow at…

Most of the killing is done during the day. Over 1,000 dead in three days of carnage. As a reporter covering conflicts over the years, I have seen many dead bodies—but never have I seen so many people dying before my eyes. The last gurgling gasp of air, the eyes turning lifeless, the rising wails of grief.

As Egypt plunges headfirst into a deadly downward spiral with no end in sight, many of its citizens are baying for still more blood. Both sides leading the conflict, the military and the Muslim Brotherhood, are playing a zero-sum game, based on a false binary demanding that Egyptians choose one or the other. Both are defined by hierarchy, patriarchy, secrecy, mendacity and a blinding sense of their own superiority. Both are juggernauts in the Egyptian body politic that have heedlessly clawed away at Egypt’s social fabric in their struggle for power, proving time and again that their own political and economic interests trump all.

In meting out violence, the military and security apparatus has an overwhelming advantage, and its forces have done so with unflinching brutality. The storming of the sit-ins supporting deposed president Mohammed Morsi on August 14 marked the bloodiest day in Egypt’s modern history, with more than 800 dead. Cairo was inundated with corpses. In the al-Iman mosque the day after the raids, more than 230 bodies lay on the floor. The smell of death hung heavy in the summer heat, as family members placed blocks of ice on the bloodied shrouds to try to stave off the decay. Many of the bodies were charred beyond recognition, blackened by the fire that burned down the field hospital and the Rabaa al-Adeweya mosque, the epicenter for Morsi’s supporters over the past six weeks.

Justifying the crackdown, the government and police repeatedly assured Egyptians and the rest of the world that, in fact, they had acted with the utmost self-restraint. “Terrorism” was the word repeatedly used, with Army spokesman Ahmed Ali succinctly summarizing the state’s logic of violence. “When dealing with terrorism,” he said, “the consideration of civil and human rights are not applicable.” The military-backed cabinet, the security establishment and the allied so-called “liberal” elite have vilified an entire swathe of society as violent extremists unfit for political life.

Those who don’t toe the line are demonized. Mohamed ElBaradei, the Nobel peace laureate who resigned as vice president of international affairs in protest of the violent storming of the sit-ins, has been subjected to a merciless defamation campaign. One popular cartoon shows him stabbing Egypt, depicted as a woman, in the back. On Sunday, August 18, he boarded a plane to Austria, declining to give interviews about the reasons for his departure.

Any media coverage remotely critical of the crackdown has been met with vicious rhetoric from all sides, manifesting itself on the streets as a rising number of attacks on journalists, particularly foreigners. On August 17, Egypt’s State Information Service released a statement to foreign correspondents, criticizing international coverage as biased in favor of the Muslim Brotherhood and accusing them of conveying “a distorted image that is very far from the facts…. This raises many questions about the neutrality of the media and its goals.”

Within Egypt, local media have helped whip up chauvinistic nationalism and a wave of state worship that has gripped the country. Millions of Egyptians have run headlong into the arms of the military and the police state to oust Morsi and his ilk, seeking a security blanket that is really a straightjacket.

As it stands now, much of Egypt is now under a month-long state of emergency and a nighttime curfew. The interior ministry has granted itself the authority to use live ammunition against anyone who assaults police or state institutions. Among those who have survived the bloodshed, more than 1,000 Islamists have been arrested and much of their leadership jailed. The prime minister has proposed disbanding the Muslim Brotherhood—or what is left of it—altogether.

Morsi’s supporters have engaged in violence of their own, killing civilians and security officials, attacking government institutions and sparking a low-level insurgency in Sinai. The security establishment appears to welcome the escalation, intentionally provoking the Islamists to adopt even more hardline tactics and commit more violence, in a bid to justify further repression and forever push them outside of politics.

Egypt’s largely helpless Christian population, meanwhile, is being forced to pay the price for the state’s brutality against the Islamists. For months the Brotherhood and its allies have used divisive religious rhetoric to further their political goals, a trend that reached new heights following Morsi’s ouster, with sectarian vitriol frequently emanating from the stage at Rabaa. After the sit-ins were forcibly dispersed, dozens of Christian churches, monasteries, schools and facilities across the country have been attacked and burned down in a wave of reprisal attacks. The police and the army have done nothing to protect them.

Each day brings new horrors, nightmarish scenes Egyptians could never have imagined. Nuns paraded on the streets like “prisoners of war.” Urban warfare with hovering choppers kicking up dust. Citizens opening fire on one another. People jumping off bridges to avoid bullets, falling and crumpling to the floor motionless. The scale of human loss is staggering—and with both sides vowing to escalate, worse days surely lie ahead.

Today, many of the revolutionaries who fought the country’s successive authoritarian regimes—first Mubarak, then the Supreme Council of Armed Forces, then the Muslim Brotherhood—now find themselves sitting on the sidelines, pushed out of the discourse and forced to watch as the bloodletting continues. The transformative revolutionary moment that exploded on January 25, 2011, has become a faint glimmer, in danger of being extinguished completely. “Despair is betrayal” is the mantra that has echoed throughout Egypt during the many tough times over the past two and half years. Today, it is very hard not to feel like a traitor.

     Sharif Abdel Kouddous

    August 18, 2013

Also by the Author

                Chaos and Bloodshed in the Streets of Cairo  (World)

The violent clampdown by security forces has all but ended the possibility of a rapprochement with the Muslim Brotherhood.

                Deadly Clashes Deepen Crisis in Egypt  (Arab Awakening)

At least seventy-four people were killed in skirmishes between Morsi supporters and armed men this weekend.

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DEMOCRACY NOW ON EGYPT and more

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kouddous

Muslim Brotherhood Calls for New Protests After Massacre by State Forces
Egypt’s political crisis is growing after the country’s deadliest violence since the Egyptian revolution broke out in 2011. At least 525 people were killed and more than 3,500 people wounded on Wednesday in government raids on protest encampments filled with supporters of ousted President Mohamed Morsi in Cairo. Police and troops used bulldozers, tear gas and live ammunition to clear out the two sit-ins. Makeshift clinics were overrun with the dead and wounded. Members of the Muslim Brotherhood responded by storming and torching police stations. Forty-three police officers were reportedly killed. Three journalists also died in Wednesday’s violence. Egypt’s army-installed government has declared a month-long state of emergency and imposed a dusk-to-dawn curfew on the capital of Cairo and 10 other provinces. The move came shortly after it installed 25 provincial governors, including 19 military generals and two loyalists of ousted dictator Hosni Mubarak. Interim Vice President Mohamed ElBaradei, a Nobel Peace laureate, resigned hours after Wednesday’s crackdown began, saying the conflict could have been resolved by peaceful means. The Muslim Brotherhood has called for new rallies in Cairo today. Mohamed el-Beltagy, a senior Muslim Brotherhood leader who lost his daughter in Wednesday’s violence, urged supporters to protest Egypt’s military.

Mohamed el-Beltagy: “I swear to God that if people don’t keep protesting, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi will just drag this country into more troubles. He will drag this nation into a civil war, so he can escape the death penalty. Be aware, Egyptian people, and go onto the streets now to announce the end of the armed forces’ political life.”

U.S. Calls Egypt Killings “Deplorable,” But No Policy Shift Announced
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In Washington, Secretary of State John Kerry condemned the violence, but the Obama administration announced no moves to cut aid to the Egyptian military.

Secretary of State John Kerry: “Today’s events are deplorable, and they run counter to Egyptian aspirations for peace, inclusion and genuine democracy. Egyptians inside and outside of the government need to take a step back. They need to calm the situation and avoid further loss of life. We also strongly oppose a return to a state of emergency law, and we call on the government to respect basic human rights including freedom of peaceful assembly and due process under the law.”

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Thoughts on the Present Dilemma in Egypt by Azmi Bishara

Azmi Bishara ( Official English Page) · [An edited translation from the Azmi Bishara Arabic facebook page]

1) The Muslim Brotherhood failed to understand the nature of the transitional phase. They failed to grasp that it was not a matter of the strongest party having the right to rule the country, but that all involved had a duty to shoulder the responsibility of governing Egypt. This shared duty of governing meant that they should have involved every single faction in the administration of the country. They should not have fallen into the trap of monopolising power, and thereby  carrying the blame for its failures and difficulties. Instead of denying participation to political factions which supported them during the second round of presidential elections, the Brotherhood should have insisted on those groups taking part in the transitional phase from the very beginning. The dismissal of [generals] Tantawi and Annan [from SCAF] provided the Brotherhood with a moment of power they needed to bring others on board. Instead, the Brotherhood announced the Constitutional Declaration [in November, 2012], and with it, much of the credibility won by Morsi was dithered away. The end result was that other groups began to avoid participation in the transitional phase. Foiling the Brotherhood’s attempts at governance became their new aim. The situation left them with no shortage of justifications to do so.

2) The Brotherhood’s opponents failed to realise that it was institutions dominated by the former regime—the media, the judiciary and other state bodies—which were the main obstacles to the President’s work.

3) The Brotherhood meanwhile did not grasp that they needed to ally themselves with other revolutionary forces in order to face the vestiges of the former regime which remained entrenched within the state. These other groups, excluded from shouldering any responsibility, came to support the remnants of the Mubarak regime, like the General Prosecutor (Attorney General), on the grounds that the actions taken against them were not legally sound. Yet only “revolutionary” and “extra-legal” actions, or a change of the laws, would have made it possible to remove these people. The Brotherhood, bound to take such revolutionary measures, stuck to the book on formalities when others wanted to join in.  Yet they also violated formalities when these stood in the way of their aims.

4) Remnants of the Mubarak regime seized their chance and ratcheted up their agitation against the elected President in an atmosphere of recrimination against the Brotherhood by other revolutionary factions.

5) The estrangement of an elected president in this way, through military intervention, holds out the risk of a spiral of events which may complicate any democratic transition. A further set of dangers is born of the possible conclusions which Islamists might deduce about electoral politics, given that they were excluded from what had been to them an important experience. Will they follow the lead of Turkey’s AKP, becoming ever more democratic with each act of military repression? Or will they instead react against any type of democratic participation? These questions cut to the heart of the democratic experiment and the fate of that experiment, as well attitudes of wide swathes of the public towards it. They should be asked by all responsible people, and are not to be taken lightly.

6) A further problematic is when wide swathes of the revolutionary movements defend a judiciary which constantly issues ruling in favour of the former regime, instead of demanding that this judiciary be reformed.

7) The Brotherhood’s stumbling block has been its partisanship, which is in fact more extreme than their religiosity. This has prevented them from allowing the interests of the nation and society to supersede those of the Party. The fact that they could not see that remnants of the former regime wanted to capitalise on this for counter-revolutionary ends, is a problem.

8) Another problematic has been the silence which has faced the former regime’s ludicrous media rhetoric, steeped in falsehoods and myths. The unjustified agitation against Palestinians is reminiscent of how the Mubarak regime behaved during the 2008/2009 war on Gaza.

9) Democratic revolutionaries must now chart a course through all of these problems and challenges, and cannot remain stagnant when the time comes to distinguish between what can be termed “the revolution within the revolution” on the path to democracy, and a counter-revolution.

10)  The deposition of an elected president is now a moot point: with a national unity government, the date for presidential and parliamentary elections can be brought forward. The act of agreeing on early elections is itself an inherently democratic procedure. The important point at this stage is how the will of a large and important section of the population has forcefully replaced another, and broken it. The desire for a forceful breaking of the will of a section of population will lead to a deep social schism, one which will pose another challenge to the democratic transition. The beneficiaries will be the usual enemies of democracy.

11) The path to democracy is long, and cannot be decided in the space of two short days. There is no need to rush to the barricades.  The important thing is that the generation of the January 25 Revolution remain on course. That generation hold the key to Egypt’s democratic, Arab future, and not the old guard who are sponging off of the youth’s efforts and bickering over the spoils.

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Egypt satirist back on air after questioning

[youtube http://youtu.be/CkPUZKdwwQY?]
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The Daily Show: Egypt, Mohamed Morsi, and Bassem Youssef

[youtube http://youtu.be/LyDOAQNsTrI?]
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Bassem Youssef Interview on Canadian TV CBC …

[youtube http://youtu.be/wDOr7krmURs?]
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