1) The Muslim Brotherhood failed to understand the nature of the transitional phase. They failed to grasp that it was not a matter of the strongest party having the right to rule the country, but that all involved had a duty to shoulder the responsibility of governing Egypt. This shared duty of governing meant that they should have involved every single faction in the administration of the country. They should not have fallen into the trap of monopolising power, and thereby carrying the blame for its failures and difficulties. Instead of denying participation to political factions which supported them during the second round of presidential elections, the Brotherhood should have insisted on those groups taking part in the transitional phase from the very beginning. The dismissal of [generals] Tantawi and Annan [from SCAF] provided the Brotherhood with a moment of power they needed to bring others on board. Instead, the Brotherhood announced the Constitutional Declaration [in November, 2012], and with it, much of the credibility won by Morsi was dithered away. The end result was that other groups began to avoid participation in the transitional phase. Foiling the Brotherhood’s attempts at governance became their new aim. The situation left them with no shortage of justifications to do so.
2) The Brotherhood’s opponents failed to realise that it was institutions dominated by the former regime—the media, the judiciary and other state bodies—which were the main obstacles to the President’s work.
3) The Brotherhood meanwhile did not grasp that they needed to ally themselves with other revolutionary forces in order to face the vestiges of the former regime which remained entrenched within the state. These other groups, excluded from shouldering any responsibility, came to support the remnants of the Mubarak regime, like the General Prosecutor (Attorney General), on the grounds that the actions taken against them were not legally sound. Yet only “revolutionary” and “extra-legal” actions, or a change of the laws, would have made it possible to remove these people. The Brotherhood, bound to take such revolutionary measures, stuck to the book on formalities when others wanted to join in. Yet they also violated formalities when these stood in the way of their aims.
4) Remnants of the Mubarak regime seized their chance and ratcheted up their agitation against the elected President in an atmosphere of recrimination against the Brotherhood by other revolutionary factions.
5) The estrangement of an elected president in this way, through military intervention, holds out the risk of a spiral of events which may complicate any democratic transition. A further set of dangers is born of the possible conclusions which Islamists might deduce about electoral politics, given that they were excluded from what had been to them an important experience. Will they follow the lead of Turkey’s AKP, becoming ever more democratic with each act of military repression? Or will they instead react against any type of democratic participation? These questions cut to the heart of the democratic experiment and the fate of that experiment, as well attitudes of wide swathes of the public towards it. They should be asked by all responsible people, and are not to be taken lightly.
6) A further problematic is when wide swathes of the revolutionary movements defend a judiciary which constantly issues ruling in favour of the former regime, instead of demanding that this judiciary be reformed.
7) The Brotherhood’s stumbling block has been its partisanship, which is in fact more extreme than their religiosity. This has prevented them from allowing the interests of the nation and society to supersede those of the Party. The fact that they could not see that remnants of the former regime wanted to capitalise on this for counter-revolutionary ends, is a problem.
8) Another problematic has been the silence which has faced the former regime’s ludicrous media rhetoric, steeped in falsehoods and myths. The unjustified agitation against Palestinians is reminiscent of how the Mubarak regime behaved during the 2008/2009 war on Gaza.
9) Democratic revolutionaries must now chart a course through all of these problems and challenges, and cannot remain stagnant when the time comes to distinguish between what can be termed “the revolution within the revolution” on the path to democracy, and a counter-revolution.
10) The deposition of an elected president is now a moot point: with a national unity government, the date for presidential and parliamentary elections can be brought forward. The act of agreeing on early elections is itself an inherently democratic procedure. The important point at this stage is how the will of a large and important section of the population has forcefully replaced another, and broken it. The desire for a forceful breaking of the will of a section of population will lead to a deep social schism, one which will pose another challenge to the democratic transition. The beneficiaries will be the usual enemies of democracy.
11) The path to democracy is long, and cannot be decided in the space of two short days. There is no need to rush to the barricades. The important thing is that the generation of the January 25 Revolution remain on course. That generation hold the key to Egypt’s democratic, Arab future, and not the old guard who are sponging off of the youth’s efforts and bickering over the spoils.
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